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ABSTRACT: In Front Polisario (judgment of 21 December 2016, case C-104/16 P, Council of the Euro-
pean Union v. Front Polisario [GC]), the Court of Justice was called to assess the validity of a deci-
sion that had concluded an agreement providing for reciprocal liberalisation measures on agricul-
ture and fishery products between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco. The agreement had been 
implemented by the parties as covering also products originating from Western Sahara, a non-self-
governing territory militarily occupied by Morocco. In its previous case law, the Court of Justice had 
mainly limited to procedural aspects the judicial review of acts related to the EU’s foreign relations. 
In Front Polisario it took a different view, and assessed the validity of the decision also on the mer-
its. This Insight examines the technique used by the Court of Justice, and tries to identify which 
reasons led it to depart from its traditional standard of judicial review. 
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I. Preliminary remarks: judicial review of international agreements 
between self-restraint and judicial activism 
Judicial review of international acts, or of their implementing domestic acts, often proves 
to be a tough task for domestic courts.  
From an inward-looking perspective, there is no reason to depart from the classical 
view that, insofar as international agreements produce effects – directly or indirectly – 
within the domestic legal order, they are subject to judicial review, as is the case for 
purely domestic acts.1 However, it should be considered that judicial review of interna-
 
* PhD in International Law and European Union Law, University of Rome “La Sapienza”, 
aurora.rasi@uniroma1.it. 
1 See the famous dictum in Kadi: “[t]he Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in 
principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all European Union acts in the light of fundamental rights” 
(Court of Justice, judgment of 3 September 2008, joined cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission [GC], para. 326). 
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tional agreements or of their implementing legislation, unlike that of purely domestic 
acts, has a significant impact on the sphere of international relations. In other words, by 
interpreting international acts or by judging their validity, domestic courts may interfere 
with foreign relations: a field that is normally the competence of the executive. 
This explains why domestic courts, when asked to review the validity of an interna-
tional act, or of its implementing domestic acts, are faced with a dilemma: should they de-
fer to the view of the executive organs, or should they superimpose their view on that of 
the executive, thus creating international embarrassment and breaching the principle that 
international actors must speak with one voice in the sphere of international affairs? 
There is no well-grounded answer to this dilemma in legal theory and practice. 
Whereas in certain legal orders courts have traditionally maintained self-restraint, in 
others they seem to have been inspired by a judicial activism.2  
The case law of the CJEU has been constantly inspired by a third approach, which 
may be called the procedural approach. 
The CJEU maintained that the acts adopted by the Council, and related to the EU’s 
foreign relations power, are not exempted from judicial scrutiny. However, the CJEU al-
so maintained it has to respect the wide discretion possessed by the Council in shaping 
EU foreign relations. Therefore, it generally considered itself prevented from evaluating 
the merit of the acts adopted by the Council in this area. It could not verify, for instance, 
if those acts represent the only or the best possible measures to deal with an interna-
tional situation. The judicial scrutiny was thus limited to formal aspects, namely to the 
evaluation of the correctness of the procedure followed by the Council for the adoption 
of the relevant acts. For example, the Court assessed whether those acts were mani-
festly inappropriate, having regard to the objective which the competent institution was 
seeking to pursue, or whether the Council based its choice on objective criteria, or 
whether, in exercising its wide discretion, the Council had fully taken into account all the 
interests involved.3 
 
2 For an account of a never ending debate, see J.P. COLE, The Political Question Doctrine: Justiciability 
and the Separation of Powers, Congressional Research Service: Informing the Legislative Debate since 
1914, 23 December 2014, fas.org. On the judicial review of international agreements, see E. CANNIZZARO, 
Trattati internazionali e giudizio di costituzionalità, Milano: Giuffré, 1991; G. GAJA, Trends in Judicial Activ-
ism and Judicial Self-Restraint Relating to Community Agreements, in E. CANNIZZARO (ed.), The European 
Union as an Actor in International Relations, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002, p. 117 et seq.; M. 
MENDEZ, Constitutional review of Treaties: Lessons for Comparative Constitutional Design and Practice, in 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2017, p. 95 et seq. 
3 See Court of Justice, judgment of 8 June 2010, case C-58/08, Vodafone et al. [GC], para. 52: “the cri-
terion to be applied is not whether a measure adopted in such an area was the only or the best possible 
measure, since its legality can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard 
to the objective which the competent institution is seeking to pursue”. The manifest inappropriateness 
standard has been adopted in Court of Justice, judgment of 1 March 2016, case C-440/14, National Iranian 
Oil Company v. Council [GC]: in that case the Court, asked to rule on the validity of two Council Decisions 
related to the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, clarified that: “the Union legislature must 
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II. The decision of the General Court in Front Polisario and the 
procedural approach 
The procedural approach also inspired the ruling of the General Court in Front Polisario 
v. Council of the European Union. 
The General Court was asked to rule on the validity of a Council Decision that had 
concluded an international agreement between the EU and Morocco, aimed to facilitate 
the exchange of agricultural and fisheries products originating from the territory of ei-
ther party (the liberalisation agreement). The applicant asked the General Court to an-
nul the contested decision because it concluded a treaty which violated, among others, 
the international peremptory principle of self-determination. The applicant, Front Poli-
sario, argued that the agreement had been indeed implemented by the parties as cov-
ering also products originating from Western Sahara, a non-self-governing territory un-
lawfully occupied by Morocco and entitled to self-determination.4  
The General Court remarked that the Council possessed “wide discretion” in deciding 
“whether it is appropriate to conclude an agreement with a non-member State”. Thus, the 
“judicial review must necessarily be limited to the question whether […] the Council, by 
approving the conclusion of an agreement […], made manifest errors of assessment”.5  
 
be allowed a broad discretion in areas which involve political, economic and social choices on its part, and 
in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments. […] [T]he legality of a measure adopted in 
those fields can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate having regard to the objective 
which the competent institution is seeking to pursue” (para. 77). See also Court of Justice: judgment of 1 
February 2007, case C-266/05, Sison v. Council, para. 33; judgment of 10 January 2006, case C-344/04, 
IATA and ELFAA [GC], para. 80; judgment of 10 March 1998, case C-122/95, Germany v. Council, para. 79; 
judgment of 28 November 2013, case C-348/12 P, Council v. Manufacturing Support & Procurement Kala 
Naft, para. 120. Among the most recent example of the procedural approach, see Court of Justice, judg-
ment of 17 October 2013, case C-101/12, Schaible, paras. 47-50. On the identification of the objective cri-
teria for judicial review, see Court of Justice, judgment of 16 December 2008, case C-127/07, Arcelor At-
lantique et al. [GC], paras. 57-59. 
4 Front Polisario is a liberation movement allegedly representative of the Saharawi people, a large 
part of the population of Western Sahara, an area added in 1963 by the UN to the list of non-self-
governing territories and still today occupied by Morocco. Historical surveys of the facts are collected in 
General Court, judgment of 10 December 2015, case T-512/12, Front Polisario v. Council of the European 
Union, paras. 1-16; Court of Justice, judgment of 21 December 2016, case C-104/16 P, Council of the Eu-
ropean Union v. Front Polisario [GC], paras. 21-37; Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 13 September 
2016, case C-104/16 P, Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario, paras. 5-20. 
5 Expressly, the General Court relied on the procedural approach in the precedent of Odigitria v. 
Council and Commission (judgment of 6 July 1995, case T-572/93, par. 38). In a question concerning the 
judicial review of two fishing agreements concluded by the EU with two States (Senegal and Guinea Bis-
sau), the General Court, upholding a self-restraint approach, clarified that the Council possessed “a wide 
discretion in the field of the Community's external economic relations”. In that case, the applicant asked 
the Court to assess whether the Council overlapped its discretion by not taking into account all interests 
involved in the circumstances, and in particular by disregarding the dispute between Senegal and Guinea 
Bissau for the delimitation of their maritime zones. The General Court, however, did not enter on the 
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The General Court found that, in the specific case, the Council was required to eval-
uate “carefully and impartially, all the relevant facts in order to ensure that the produc-
tion of goods for export [was] not conducted to the detriment of the population of the 
territory concerned, or entails infringements of fundamental rights”. The General Court 
concluded that the Council had not taken into consideration those elements and, thus, 
since it “failed to fulfil its obligation to examine all the elements of the case before the 
adoption” of an act, the contested decision was to be annulled.6  
It is worth noting that the adoption of the procedural approach by the General Court 
in that particular case did not turn out to uphold the course taken by the EU political insti-
tutions.  
Indeed, the General Court annulled the contested decision and, by so doing, it inter-
fered with the conduct of the foreign relations powers of these Institutions. However, for 
the reasons that will be expounded in the subsequent sections, the interference was 
quite limited. The annulment was pronounced only because the Council failed to exam-
ine “carefully and impartially all the relevant facts of the individual case, facts which 
support the conclusions reached”.7 In particular, the Council “should have satisfied itself 
that there was no evidence of an exploitation of the natural resources of the territory of 
 
merits of the Council evaluation of the interests involved in the case, nor did it examine whether the 
Council would have had to pay attention to the dispute between the two States. On the contrary, the 
General Court limited itself to reiterate Council’s argumentations on the matter. 
6 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, cit., paras. 223-225, 241, 247. That the General 
Court did not evaluate Council’s action on the merits, but it was only because of procedural errors that it 
declared the illegitimacy of the contested decision, is confirmed by Opinion of AG Wathelet, Council of the 
European Union v. Front Polisario, cit., paras. 234-236. It is worth noting that the judgment of the General 
Court complied with the previous case law of the Court of Justice not only because it upheld the proce-
dural approach, but also for another aspect. In determining the territorial scope of the agreement be-
tween the EU and Morocco, the General Court relied on the customary international rules transposed in 
Art. 31, para. 3, let. b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It thus took into ac-
count the practice of the parties of the treaty following its adoption and found that the EU, while fully 
aware of the application of the treaty by Morocco to Western Sahara, did not protest. This lack of contes-
tation was considered, by the General Court, as an implicit acceptation of the inclusion of Western Sahara 
in the territorial scope of the agreement (cf. Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, cit., paras. 
94, 98-103; Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., par. 119). At a closer look, this rea-
soning does not seem alien to the case law of the Court of Justice. Only few moths before the General 
Court issued its judgement in Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union the Court of Justice, in 
Oberto and O’Leary, applied Art. 31, para. 3, let. b) VCLT. In that case the Court of Justice stated that “the 
subsequent practice followed in the application of a treaty may override the clear terms of that treaty if 
that practice reflects the parties’ agreement”. Then, it found that a practice, which has never “been the 
subject of challenge by the parties to that convention […] must be regarded as reflecting their tacit 
agreement to such a practice” (Court of Justice, judgment of 11 March 2015, joined cases C-464/13 and C-
465/13, Oberto and O’Leary, paras. 38, 60-66). 
7 Front Polisario v. Council of the European Union, cit., para. 225. 
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Western Sahara under Moroccan control likely to be to the detriment of its inhabitants 
and to infringe their fundamental rights”.8 
In consequence of this finding, the Council could have re-issued the contested deci-
sion stating the reasons requested by the General Court or, possibly, re-open the nego-
tiations in order to conclude the liberalisation agreement anew by including a process 
of verification that the implementation of the agreement to the territory of Western Sa-
hara was not made to the detriment of the population and of their fundamental rights. 
III. The substantive approach in the decision of the Court of Justice 
in Front Polisario 
Ruling on appeals, the Court of Justice has abandoned the procedural approach. The 
Court of Justice found that the General Court’s decision was based on a number of er-
rors of law and, therefore, it annulled it.9 
For the purposes of the current Insight, it is worth noting that the Court of Justice 
conducted a careful assessment on the merits. In particular, the Court of Justice found 
that the provision, that determined the territorial scope of the agreement, ought to be 
construed in accordance with the international peremptory principle of self-
determination, even if this interpretation was at odds with the practice followed by the 
parties in implementing the agreement. 
In the view of the Court, such practice did not establish the existence of an agree-
ment between the parties regarding its interpretation, under Art. 31, par. 3, let. b), VCLT 
and, therefore, should be discarded. On that basis, the Court easily concluded that 
products originating from Western Sahara did not fall within the territorial scope of the 
agreement and that the provision that determined the territorial scope of the agree-
ment ought to be construed in a way that contradicted the practice followed by the par-
ties, in order to be compatible with the international peremptory principle of self-
determination.10 
 
8 Ibidem, para. 241. 
9 Cf. Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., paras. 86, 89, 93, 99, 103, 108, 115-
116, 122, 125, 127. It is worth noting that the Court of Justice did not examine the argument, upheld by 
the Council in its appeal, related to an alleged misconstruction of “the extent to which [the General Court] 
was able judicially to review [Council’s] discretion” in the field of EU’s “external economic relations”. (see 
paras. 72 and 126). 
10 An analogous issue has dealt with by the Court of Justice in Brita (judgment of 25 February 2010, 
case C-386/10). The Court was asked to interpret the territorial scope of the association agreement be-
tween the EU and Israel, in order to assess whether it was applicable to the West Bank. The Court of Jus-
tice read the statutory provision of the association agreement in light of other international norms: the 
customary principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt and Art. 73 of the association agreement be-
tween the EU and the PLO, which states that the agreement applied to the “territories of the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip” (paras. 43-47). It concluded that the territorial scope of the association agreement 
between the EU and Israel “must be interpreted as meaning that […] the West Bank do[es] not fall within 
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The consequence of these findings is that the EU is bound to interpret the liberali-
sation agreement as excluding from its scope products originating from Western Saha-
ra. By so doing, the Court imposed thus a radically different course in the conduct of 
the EU foreign relations relations with Morocco.  
This conclusion leads one to investigate the reasons which prompted the methodo-
logical shift from the procedural approach traditionally followed in the case law of the 
Court of Justice to a substantive approach, and whether these reasons may reveal the 
development of a new standard of judicial review.11 
IV. The decision of the Court of Justice between self-restraint and 
activism 
The shift in the case law of the Court of Justice has occurred almost inadvertently.  
From a superficial glance, the Court of Justice in Front Polisario has upheld all the 
request by the appellant: it annulled the decision of the General Court; it adopted the 
interpretation of the territorial scope of the liberalisation agreement suggested by the 
Council; it rejected the idea that the practice, followed by the EU political Institutions, 
did create acquiescence to the interpretation of the agreement suggested by Morocco, 
comprehending Western Sahara in its territorial scope.12 Yet, if one looks under the ve-
neer, the deference towards the position of the EU political Institutions appears to be 
 
the territorial scope of that agreement” (para. 53). Still, while the assessment demanded of the Court of 
Justice in Brita may appear similar to the one asked in Front Polisario insofar as the interpretation of the 
territorial scope of an agreement is concerned, the differences be-tween the two cases should be high-
lighted. In the fist place, in Brita the Court was required to issue a preliminary ruling on the interpretation 
of a statutory provision, and not a ruling on the validity of an act as in Front Polisario. Therein lies the 
main discrepancy with Front Polisario, as well as the reason why Brita does not seem relevant in examin-
ing the criteria applied by the Court for the judicial review of political acts of the Council: it is not a case of 
judicial review at all. The second key difference between Brita and Front Polisario is that Brita arose be-
cause the EU refused to apply the association agreement with Israel to an area not pertaining to Israel’s 
territory. In Front Polisario, as seen, the case was instead prompted because the EU accepted the applica-
tion of the liberalisation agreement with Morocco to an area not pertaining to Morocco’s territory.  
11 For more comprehensive analysis of the judgment, see E. KASSOTI: The Front Polisario v. Council 
Case: The General Court, Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit and the External Aspect of European Integration 
(First Part), in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No 1, p. 339 et seq., www.europeanpapers.eu; The Council v. 
Front Polisario Case: The Court of Justice’s Selective Reliance on International Rules on Treaty Interpreta-
tion (Second Part), in European Papers, 2017, Vol. 2, No 1, p. 23 et seq., www.europeanpapers.eu; V. KUBE, 
The Polisario case: Do EU fundamental rights matter for EU trade policies?, in EJIL: Talk!, 3 February 2017, 
www.ejiltalk.org; C. RYNGAERT, The Polisario Front Judgment of the EU Court of Justice: a Reset of EU-
Morocco Trade Relations in the Offing, in Renforce Blog, 15 January 2017, blog.renforce.eu; MARKUS W. 
GEHRING, EU/Morocco relations and the Western Sahara: the ECJ and international law, in EU Law Analysis, 
23 December 2016, eulawanalysis.blogspot.it; S. HUMMELBRUNNER, A.-C. PRICKARTZ, EU-Morocco Trade Rela-
tions Do Not Legally Affect Western Sahara – Case C-104/16 P Council v Front Polisario, in European Law 
Blog, 5 January 2017, europeanlawblog.eu.  
12 Cf. Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., paras. 92, 96, 114, 126-127 and 134. 
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more formal than real, and the effects prompted by the Court of Justice’s ruling prove to 
be dramatically diverging from those wished by the Council and by the Commission. To 
explain what clearly appears to be an iron fist in a velvet glove, it seems indispensable 
to enter into some more detail in the factual and legal context, and in the line of reason-
ing followed by the Court. 
The territorial scope of the liberalisation agreement is determined by Art. 94 of the 
1996 association agreement between the EU and Morocco, which the liberalisation 
agreement legally refers to. The provision states that the association agreement applies 
“to the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco”. In order to determine the territorial scope 
of the liberalisation agreement it was thus necessary to ascertain the meaning of the 
expression “the territory of the Kingdom of Morocco”. 
As remarked by AG Wathelet, both the Council and the Commission asked the Court 
of Justice to interpret the agreement as not applying to the territory of Western Sahara. 
Both, however, seemed to maintain that, beyond the formal interpretation of the 
agreement, Morocco could continue to apply de facto the agreement to the products of 
Western Sahara.13 Strangely enough, neither the Commission nor the Council seemed 
to be aware of the fact that a discrepancy between the legal reality and the factual reali-
ty cannot but amount to a breach of the law. 
Beyond the hypocrisy of this claim, there is a revealing passage in the chain of as-
sumptions of the Council that may explain it. The Council, although “put[ting] forward 
different and even contradictory views”, and although never formally accepting that 
Western Sahara was part of the territory of Morocco, nonetheless added that the EU 
and Morocco “have a mutual understanding”, whereby “the European Union accepts the 
application of the agreement to the territory of Western Sahara” and Morocco will “not 
use this as an argument in support of its claim to sovereignty”.14 
The possibility for the agreement to be de facto applied to Western Sahara was in-
deed embraced in its core spirit, as “Morocco would never have accepted the agreement 
if” the EU “had included in it a clause explicitly excluding its application to Western Saha-
ra”.15 It thus seems that the Council conceived of the principle of self-determination as not 
obliging the EU to ask that Morocco, in implementing the agreement, gives faithful com-
pliance with the right of self-determination of Saharawi people.16 
 
13 Cf. Opinion of AG Wathelet, Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario, cit., paras. 64-67, 83. 
14 Ibidem, paras. 65-67.  
15 Ibidem, para. 300. 
16 Cf. Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., para. 123. Similar considerations 
may be expressed with regard to the interpretation of the principle of self-determination upheld by the 
Commission, which intervened in the case in support of the Council. Indeed the Commission admitted it 
was aware that the application of the liberalisation agreement to Western Sahara may have been regard-
ed as a violation of peremptory norms of international law (Opinion of AG Wathelet, Council of the Euro-
pean Union v. Front Polisario, cit., para. 182). Once it is excluded that the Commission intended to breach 
international peremptory rules, the only remaining option is to conclude that the Commission interpreted 
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It is precisely on this point that the Court of Justice took a different course, and a 
very radical one indeed. 
The Court read the principle of self-determination as preventing the EU from toler-
ating the conduct, performed by Morocco, of applying the liberalisation agreement to 
Western Sahara. Indeed, the Court specified that all States, under this principle, were 
required to recognise a separate and distinct status, from that of any State, to all non-
self-governing territories. Not only it would have been unacceptable to interpret Art. 94 
as including Western Sahara in the territorial scope of the agreements between the EU 
and Morocco. More broadly, the Court of Justice drew, from the principle of self-
determination, the full “inapplicability of the [association and liberalisation agreements] 
to that territory”.  
In the Court’s reasoning, the EU was thus undoubtedly barred from considering the 
liberalisation agreement as applicable, de facto or de jure, to Western Sahara. This con-
sideration would have indeed entailed, for the EU, “to implement [the agreement] in a 
manner incompatible with the principle of self-determination”.17 
There was, then, a huge discrepancy between the Council and the Court of Justice’s 
identification of the conducts forbidden by the principle of self-determination. While the 
Council upheld a narrow interpretation of the principle of self-determination,18 the Court 
of Justice read it as having a much wider scope.  
The Court of Justice clearly conceives of this principle as an all-embracing guarantee 
for peoples living in a non-self-governing territory. They are fully protected against the 
possibility of a State applying a treaty to which it is a party to their territory. Thus, while for 
the Council the principle of self-determination would have precluded international actors 
only from explicitly violating or accepting a violation of the principle itself, for the Court it 
would have also banned all conduct resulting in an implicit acceptance of an infringement 
of the right to self-determination. 
Regardless of its merits, the Court of Justice’s reading of the principle of self-
determination inescapably affected the position of the Council with regard to the im-
plementation, by Morocco, of the liberalisation agreement. Albeit not explicitly, the 
Court of Justice affected the course of foreign policy determined by the Council at the 
 
the principle of self-determination as not precluding for the EU the acceptance of a de facto application of 
the liberalisation agreement by Morocco to Western Sahara. 
17 Council of the European Union v. Front Polisario [GC], cit., paras. 88-93, 105, 123. 
18 It does not seem unreasonable to recognise, in the Council’s interpretation of the principle of self-
determination, a formalistic approach. This principle seems to have been observed almost exclusively as 
a criterion for the interpretation of statutory provisions. The principle of self-determination would have 
indeed forbidden the interpretation of Art. 94 as entailing a violation of the right to self-determination, 
but the same principle would have not barred States from implicitly accepting its infringement when 
committed de facto. 
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international level and, thus, strongly interfered with the Council competence in shap-
ing EU foreign relations. 
Consequently, the practice followed by the EU, i.e. that of accepting the de facto 
application by Morocco to Western Sahara of the liberalisation agreement, has to be 
fully abandoned. Moreover, the ruling of the Court prevents the EU from acceding to 
whatever understanding, tacit or implicit, directly or indirectly related to a breach of the 
principle of self-determination. The Council is compelled to modify its position about 
the implementation of the liberalisation agreement, and not to tolerate any longer the 
application of the agreement to Western Sahara.  
V. Concluding remarks 
In the light of the above, it would be quite arduous to maintain that, in Front Polisario, 
the Court of Justice upheld the procedural approach and did not appraise, on the mer-
its, the conduct of the Council in the EU external action field. On the contrary, it is evi-
dent that, in Front Polisario, the Court of Justice adopted a very activist approach in per-
forming the judicial review of Council acts related to the area of EU foreign relations. 
Such a radical shift appears to have been prompted by the peremptory status of 
the international rules involved. From the reasoning of the Court, it emerges that it has 
considered, albeit implicitly, the risk of the EU aiding or abetting a breach of the princi-
ple of self-determination by Morocco. Since this indirect complicity of the EU flowed 
from the Council’s misconstruction of the principle of self-determination, a mere proce-
dural review of the contested decision would not have prevented the Council from con-
tinuing to read this principle as not forbidding conducts which were, as far as the Court 
was concerned, entirely prohibited by customary international law. 
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that, in Front Polisario, the Court of Justice re-
sorted to a new standard for the judicial review of acts related to the foreign affairs ar-
ea, because of the interests involved in the specific case. The interest in protecting the 
prerogatives of the Council in dealing with EU foreign relations would be recessive, in 
particular, when the interest to fulfil international peremptory law comes at stake. In 
turn, the interest of the EU to not infringe fundamental rights through its international 
conduct would also allow the Court of Justice to interfere with the Council in shaping EU 
foreign relations.  
All in all, the Court of Justice in Front Polisario seems to have developed a sort of 
subsidiary approach. When the Council is not able to develop EU foreign relations in a 
way that proves to be compatible with customary international law and with the protec-
tion of fundamental rights, the Court of Justice will step in, in order to protect the EU’s 
main objectives on the international plane. 
 
